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A Note on Family Influence and the Adoption of 





In a recent article, König, Kammerlander, and Enders (2013) use Miller and Le Breton-Miller's 
(2005) 4Cs model of command, continuity, community, and connections to examine the effect of 
family influence on the adoption of discontinuous technologies. By assuming that family 
influence differs only in degree rather than kind, their model downplays the likelihood of 
heterogeneous behaviors among family firms. In this conceptual note, that assumption is 
challenged and König et al.’s work is extended by explaining how heterogeneity in the family's 
relative emphasis on command, continuity, community, and connections requires that the multi-
faceted and potentially non-linear nature of family influence be considered when analyzing 





Family business studies must not only differentiate family from non-family firms but also 
explore heterogeneous behaviors within the family firm population (Chrisman et al., 2012). 
However, there remains a general tendency to oversimplify the nature of family influence, a 
tendency that restricts the understanding of the sources and consequences of heterogeneous 
family firm behavior. For instance, in a recent AMR article, König, Kammerlander, and Enders 
(2013) examine the effect of family influence on the adoption of discontinuous technologies. 
They use the “4Cs model” of Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) to link the owning family’s 
priorities toward command (current control of the firm), continuity (transgenerational 
sustainability of control), community (bonding social capital), and connections (bridging social 
capital) with decision-making in family firms. König et al. argue that family influence causes a 
shift in the organizational constraints typically faced by firms. Specifically, they propose that 
family influence leads to lower levels of formalization, resource dependence on external 
providers of capital, and political resistance. They also propose that family influence is 
associated with higher levels of emotional ties to existing assets and mental model rigidity 
among organization members. Based on these relationships they then propose that family 
influence will reduce the speed of recognition, aggressiveness, and flexibility of the adoption of 
discontinuous technologies but results in faster implementation and higher stamina if adoption 
does occur. Overall, König et al.'s model implies that family firms are less likely to adopt 
discontinuous technologies than non-family firms.  
Despite its merits, König et al.'s model neglects important factors that cause 
heterogeneity in family firms and therefore provides only a partial understanding of how family 
firms respond to strategic choices such as the adoption of discontinuous technologies. In this 




aim of building on their work to develop research propositions on how the heterogeneity aspects 
of family influence affect the adoption of discontinuous technologies in family firms. 
Critical Assumptions of König et al. (2013) 
 
König et al. consider family influence to be “a continuous dimension, ranging from low 
to high, along which all companies can be arrayed” (2013: 421). Similarly, König et al. assume 
that the 4Cs are “reflective, covariant indicators of family influence” (2013: 422). Taken together 
these two assumptions are meant to assert that the 4Cs of family influence should increase or 
decrease together and that therefore they form a single construct that will have a consistent effect 
on family firm decision-making that depends solely on the level of influence. Assuming how 
much a family is able to influence firm behavior is determined solely and linearly by the degree 
of overlap between the family and business system is reasonable. However, to assume that how 
that influence is exercised can be captured by a single, linear construct is problematic since how 
family influence translates into firm behavior is likely to vary in type as well as degree according 
to the goals of key family stakeholders and their willingness to use their power to govern the firm 
in a particularistic way (Carney, 2005; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). For example, Chrisman and 
Patel (2012) show that irrespective of a family’s current control (command), the importance of 
the transgenerational sustainability of control (continuity) can vary among family firms and that 
this variation produces heterogeneous R&D investment decisions. Moreover, family influence is 
also a function of resources since fiat is ultimately shaped by the types and magnitude of the 
responses a firm is capable of producing and family involvement is thought to promote access to 
some resources and preclude access to other resources (Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010). Finally, 
when idiosyncratic family influence is exercised could also vary depending upon situational 




shocks. Such factors can lead to changes in goals and governance structures, and thus cause 
preference reversals that alter the behavior of family firms (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; Patel 
and Chrisman, forthcoming). 
Nonetheless, even the relationship between the degree of family influence and firm 
behavior might not be strictly linear for at least two reasons. First, one of the primary 
conclusions of Miller and Le Breton-Miller was that “each of the Cs, when taken to extremes has 
a sinister side: continuity becomes stagnation, community clannish insularity, connection 
dependence and command carelessness” (2005: 526). In the context of König et al.’s model, this 
suggests that moderate levels of family influence could produce higher (or even possibly lower) 
levels of discontinuous technology adoption than found in firms on the extremes of the family 
influence continuum, rather than medium amounts as a linear relationship would require.  
Second, command, continuity, community, and connection are not necessarily positively 
related to each other and could also have divergent relationships with innovative activities, such 
as the adoption of discontinuous technologies. For example, the importance attached to 
command and continuity need not translate into comparable levels of regard for community in 
general (Verbeke and Kano, 2012), especially in environments with underdeveloped institutions 
(Ilias, 2006; Luo and Chung, 2013). Furthermore, Chrisman and Patel's (2012) findings suggest 
that the impact of command and continuity on R&D investments are contradictory: greater 
family command tends to decrease such investments whereas the pursuit of continuity tends to 
increase them. Thus, given the potential for inconsistent and diverse relationships, which will be 
further discussed below, the combined influence of the 4Cs on discontinuous innovation will not 






The Heterogeneity of Discontinuous Technology Adoption 
 
As implied above, from a conceptual point of view a potential reason for the discrepancy 
between König et al.’s (2013) theory and the empirical evidence is that they seem to focus most 
of their arguments on the family's power to command, assuming that as the power to govern the 
firm through control of ownership and management increases, so does the likelihood that a 
particular and predictable set of behaviors will follow.  However, power only determines the 
ability to pursue goals, not what goals will be pursued. Rather, goals determine how power is 
used. Research and theory suggest that continuity is a chief goal guiding a family firm's actions 
(cf., Chrisman et al., 2012). Furthermore, community and connections are resources that are 
influenced by (and subsequently influence) the goals and governance structure enacted by the 
dominant coalition of decision makers. Thus, command is a necessary condition but not a 
sufficient condition for a family to exercise influence and only provides a partial understanding 
of the nature of the idiosyncratic behavior that is likely to occur (cf., Zellweger et al., 2012). 
How and when family owners and managers exercise their influence will also be a function of 
how much they value continuity; other factors, such as the stocks and flows of their investments 
in building community and connections with various stakeholders also come into play.  
In the following sections an argument is presented that the heterogeneity of family firms 
comes from the governance structures used, the goals sought, and the resources available in both 
family and business systems. In addition, idiosyncratic situational factors that could produce 
preference reversals in family firms are also considered. By doing so, propositions that extend, 
and in some cases contradict Konig et al.’s work are developed. For illustrative purposes and to 
link these arguments more closely to König et al.'s model, propositions are framed according to 




Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) and references to König et al.'s original propositions are 
italicized. Nevertheless, there are a number of equally useful alternative ways to capture the 
goals (e.g., socioemotional wealth: Berrone, Cruz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2012), governance (e.g., 
ownership configurations: Gersick et al., 1997), and resources (e.g., generic non-tradable assets: 
Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010) of family firms.    
The Governance Perspective: Family Command and Discontinuous Technology Adoption. 
If the family does not control the firm through some combination of ownership, management 
involvement, and board representation its ability to influence firm decisions and achieve family-
centered goals is limited (De Massis et al., forthcoming). In this light, König et al.'s assumptions 
that family command is geared toward current control and therefore associated with lower 
formalization (because owners are already motivated and efficient monitors), resource 
dependence on external capital (because of a lack of pressure to grow as well as reluctance to 
share power or increase risk), and political resistance (because of concentrated ownership and 
management control), are acceptable. To expect that command will exacerbate any tendency on 
the part of owners and managers to develop emotional ties to assets and rigid mental models is 
also reasonable. Existing assets represent the fruits of the decisions of family owners, managers, 
or their predecessors and mental models that have worked and gone unchallenged are unlikely to 
change in the absence of an endogenous or exogenous shock. Thus, both König et al.'s model, 
and the findings of other studies (e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012), support the conclusion that 
command will reduce the adoption of discontinuous technologies by reducing the speed and 
aggressiveness of the process.  
Proposition 1: The relationship between the degree of family command of a firm and the 





The Goals Perspective: Family Continuity and Discontinuous Technology Adoption. Family 
firms may further vary owing to the array of goals pursued by organizational members (Kotlar 
and De Massis, 2013). For example, the relative importance of economic and non-economic 
goals can lead to heterogeneous outcomes because are often, but not necessarily, trade-offs 
between the achievement of those goals (Zellweger and Nason, 2008). Furthermore, there are a 
wide variety of possible economic and non-economic goals, and neither set is necessarily 
internally compatible. For example, sales growth does not always translate into profits and intra-
family succession does not always lead to an enhanced reputation or even family harmony.  
One set of family-centered non-economic goals that has been highlighted in the literature 
is the family’s intention to hand over the business to later generations. Given an intention for 
continuity, family-influenced firms may engage in behaviors that are more long-term than short-
term oriented, which is contradictory to the general conclusions drawn by König et al. In this 
regard, family owners may perceive the adoption of discontinuous technologies to contribute to 
the creation of economic and socioemotional wealth and, accordingly, increase family business 
continuity. In addition, continuity is often perceived as hierarchically more important than other 
family-centered non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2012; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). 
Hence, given the possibility that maintaining continuity requires change and growth, the family 
may be willing to seek external funding, abandon existing assets, and make other strategic 
changes that will increase rather than decrease the recognition, aggressiveness, and flexibility of 
the adoption of discontinuous technologies, when these actions are perceived as increasing the 
odds for long-term survival.  
Proposition 2: The relationship between the importance of family firm continuity and the 






The Resource Perspective: Family Community and Connections, and Discontinuous 
Technology Adoption. Maintaining the relational intensity among employees in the family firm 
(referred to as community in König et al.) is an important resource. However, non-family 
employees do not necessarily share emotional ties and identity with the family (Verbeke and 
Kano, 2012). Community may therefore depend upon the extent to which the controlling family 
builds more rather than less transparent and formalized human resource policies concerning 
hiring, promotion, and compensation. This means that high concerns for community may lead to 
higher instead of lower formalization as suggested by König et al. Community also suggests that 
non-family employees may be given more power and legitimacy in decision-making, which 
could either increase political resistance or efforts to find common ground among family and 
non-family stakeholders. Consequently, commitment to the status quo or to changing the status 
quo could increase, thereby further entrenching or overthrowing the mental models of family 
owners and managers. Likewise, an increase in community could be positively or negatively 
related to the desire to preserve existing assets past the time when they add economic value to 
the firm. Overall, given that an increase in community implies compatibility between the family 
and internal non-family stakeholders, its effect upon the aggressiveness, stamina, and flexibility 
of the adoption of discontinuous technology is likely related to whether the family emphasizes 
short-term command or long-term continuity.  
Proposition 3: If command prevails over continuity in family firm decision making, the 
relationship between the degree of community and the adoption of discontinuous technologies is 
negative; if continuity prevails over command, the relationship is positive.  
 
Finally, family firms vary widely in terms of organizational resources, such as their 
connections with customers, suppliers, competitors, government, and other stakeholders. 




help family firms more quickly recognize the need to adopt discontinuous technologies. Such 
connections may also increase access and reduce the cost of external financial resources, which 
could increase their use and decrease the perceived risk of adopting discontinuous technologies. 
Connections with external stakeholders should expose family owners and managers to new 
knowledge and this will likely reduce the rigidity of the mental models of decision makers, 
thereby increasing flexibility. Thus, connections should be positively associated with many of the 
factors that Konig et al. suggest will increase the adoption of discontinuous technologies.  
Proposition 4: The relationship between the external connections of family owners and managers 
and the adoption of discontinuous technologies is positive. 
 
Preference Reversals in Family Firms and Discontinuous Technology Adoption. 
Commenting on the study by Chrisman and Patel (2012), König et al. argue that “threat 
perception in family-influenced firms could result in lower investments in discontinuous 
technologies” (2013: 436).  This argument is partially built upon the belief that family influence 
increases the rigidity of the mental models of family decision makers and that this rigidity will 
reduce flexibility in spite of the lower formalization of the governance structures of family firms. 
In other words, although König et al. seem to take for granted the predominance of command, 
they do not allow for situational factors that lead to preference reversals. As noted by Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2010), performance hazards that endanger the family’s socioemotional wealth often 
lead to actions that are diametrically opposed to the actions one might observe in other more 
stable and favorable situations, i.e., risk-seeking behavior replaces risk-averse behavior. Indeed, 
Patel and Chrisman’s (forthcoming) recent work shows that when performance is below 
aspirations, family firms not only invest more in R&D than non-family firms, they also switch 
their emphasis from variance-reducing, exploitative investments to mean-enhancing, exploratory 




internationalization strategies in response to threats of imitation. Finally, the qualitative study by 
Kotlar and De Massis (2013) suggests that family firms re-frame their organizational goals when 
intra-family succession is imminent. 
Again, heterogeneous behavior emanating from preference reversals challenges a strictly 
linear and strongly interdependent interpretation of the dimensions of family influence. Indeed, 
contrary to König et al.'s arguments, the governance structure of family firms enables them the 
flexibility to rapidly recognize and aggressively seize opportunities or counter threats (Carney, 
2005), and the literature shows that they will do so when the survival of the firm as an economic 
and/or family-influenced entity is considered to be in jeopardy. Hence:  
Proposition 5: The relationship between family command and the adoption of discontinuous 
technologies turns positive in the wake of situations (e.g., performance hazard, exogenous 
shocks, and generational transitions) that may threat the family’s socio-emotional wealth. 
 
Conclusions 
Family firms are different as well as more heterogeneous than non-family firms because 
they have a unique and expanded goal set (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Kotlar and De Massis, 
2013). These goals can change according to the whims of the family, especially when facing 
critical situations such as performance hazards, exogenous shocks, and generational transitions. 
Family firms are also heterogeneous because their governance structures permit great flexibility 
and unusual fiat, but vary in their effect on decision making according to factors that affect the 
firm's goal structure, such as the extent of inter- and intra-generational family ownership 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). Finally, variations in the resources and capabilities family members 
bring, individually and collectively, to the firm will also generate heterogeneity (Carney, 2005) 
as they determine the goals that can or cannot be achieved and the opportunities than can or 




König et al.’s model is not general enough to accommodate variations in family business 
goals, governance structures, resources, and idiosyncratic situational factors that can affect 
strategic decisions regarding innovation such as the adoption of discontinuous technologies. 
However, as the field of family business moves forward, the sources and consequences of family 
firm heterogeneity need to be identified and understood. This conceptual note only begins to 
tackle this complex issue but hopefully illustrates some of the opportunities to increase 
knowledge about the family form of organization that are available if these basic considerations 
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